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15. The Ôinstitutional factorÕ in the theory
of international trade: new vs. old
trade theories*
Sergio Parrinello
INTRODUCTION
In the development of the pure theory of international trade, from the late
1960s up to the present day, the following directions of theoretical work
appear prominent. Until the late 1970s we find:
1. The dimensional issue:
a. beyond the dimensions of the 2 ´ 2 ´ 2 model;1
b. reappraisal and criticism of the HeckscherÐOhlin, Samuelson,
Rybcyznsky theorems from the point of view of capital theory.2
2. Theories with exogenous limits imposed on distributive variables and
equilibrium unemployment:
a. neo-Marxian and neo-Ricardian models.3
b. neoclassical models in which rigidities in distributive variables are
subsumed under the theory of Ômarket distortionsÕ.4
After the 1970s other main directions emerged and can be grouped under
the following headings:
3. Trade theory with external economies, increasing returns, imperfect
competition, location-agglomeration theory.5
4. Trade theory in which the Ôinstitutional factorÕ is assumed to be endoge-
nous.6
A terminological clarification is necessary. In this paper (3) and (4) are
called the Ônew trade theoryÕ, although in the current literature this expression
is used to denote mainly (3). ÔOld trade theoriesÕ include both RicardoÕs clas-
sical approach and HeckscherÐOhlinÕs neoclassical trade theory. Furthermore
the term Ôinstitutional factorÕ will be used as a catch-all term to encompass
concepts such as institutions, social norms, laws, rules, standards, conven-
tions, customs and political agencies.
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The new trade theory represents novel perspectives compared with the old
trade theories and at the same time it constitutes a resumption of Adam SmithÕs
and OhlinÕs ideas. Increasing returns and different institutional arrangements
or different causes of such arrangements explain international specialization
and trade flows even between countries which are identical in terms of factor
endowments, technology and preferences for private goods. In this context the
pattern of trade Ð even in the weak sense of a chain of exportable/importable
goods cut somewhere by reciprocal demand Ð cannot be determined by a
comparison of two isolated countries. Comparative advantage can be affected
by historical accidents and become a solution to a general political-economic
equilibrium system. As a consequence, the institutional factor appears as a
crucial element in a non-purely-verbal distinction between theories of interre-
gional trade and theories of international trade. This distinction is acknowl-
edged in the non-analytical discourse of the old trade theories, but it is seldom
revealed in the formal models by which such theories are formulated. The new
trade theory has the merit of dealing with this hidden factor explicitly.
This paper presents: (1) a reappraisal of some ideas of Smith, Ricardo and
Ohlin which anticipate the role assigned to the institutional factor in the new
theory; (2) a critical assessment of how this factor is modelled in the trade
theory in which the Ôinstitutional factorÕ is assumed to be endogenous (see (4)
above); (3) a general evaluation of the progress brought about by the new trade
theory; and (4) an indication of how the same factor can be treated according
to (2a) above and in the light of the old trade theories.
THE INSTITUTIONAL FACTOR IN THE OLD TRADE
THEORIES: SMITH, RICARDO AND OHLIN REVISITED
Kindleberger (1978) has emphasized the concept of magistracy that is found
in Adam Smith with regard to the theory of international trade. In Smith,
magistracy means three distinct functions performed by the government: (1)
protection of society from violence and injustice by other societies, (2) protec-
tion of each member of society from similar hostile behaviour by other
members of the same society, and (3) the supply of public works. According
to Kindleberger the main point inspired by the Smithian concept of magistracy
is that:
there is no necessary connection between free trade and laissez-faire . . . Law and
order are complements to foreign trade . . . To permit the competition and free trade
. . . some institutions may be necessary to protect a country from the most untoward
effects of competition from abroad . . . At a more fundamental level, the difference
between interregional and international trade explored by Ohlin lies in the existence
within a nation of a government that tempers the wind to the shorn lamb through
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various redistribution devises, while in international trade such mechanisms (for
example, foreign aid) are rudimentary, if they do in fact exist . . . One intangible
public good or institution is the state itself. (Kindleberger, 1978: 3, 5 emphasis
added).
I agree with this view. I agree less with the criticism that Kindleberger
addresses to Smith: ÔIt was perhaps the fallacy of misplaced concreteness that
led Adam Smith to separate out Òroads, bridges, canals and harboursÓ from
public or collective goods such as law, order, justice, weights and measures,
and stable moneyÕ (Kindleberger, 1978: 7; see also Kindleberger (1983)). Of
course, the distinction between tangible and intangible public goods does not
justify as such a separate treatment of public works and what I call the insti-
tutional factor. Both categories are public goods according to the standard
characterization centred on the lack of rivalry and of excludability. The impor-
tant difference between the two lies in their different responses to a changing
environment. The extent to which public works adapt to external changes is
not different from that which pertains to private fixed capital and mainly
reflects technical conditions. By contrast, social norms and laws are subjected
to special inertia because of coordination and enforcement problems.
With regard to Ricardo I wish to reiterate a position already presented by
Negishi (1985) and Parrinello (1988a), according to which the textbook
Ricardian model is a misinterpretation of RicardoÕs trade theory. In fact, the
Ricardian model is constructed as a special case of a neoclassical model of
international trade: only one immobile factor, labour, and fixed labour coeffi-
cients whose differences across the trading countries are interpreted as differ-
ences in technologies. By contrast RicardoÕs own theory of comparative
advantage can be founded on differences in the production sets which depend
on different institutions and in principle are consistent with the assumption of
a uniform technology. Furthermore that theory does not rule out international
movements of capital and labour. We read in Ricardo, as (passage already
quoted in Negishi 1985):
Experience, however, shows that the fancied or real insecurity of capital, when not
under the immediate control of its owner, together with the natural disinclination
which every man has to quit the country of his birth and connections, and intrust
himself, with all his habits fixed, to a strange government and new laws, check the
emigration of capital. These feelings, which I should be sorry to see weakened,
induce most men of property to be satisfied with a low rate of profits in their own
country, rather than seek a more advantageous employment for their wealth in
foreign nations. [Ricardo, 1951: 136Ð7).
Therefore, capital and labour movements can be limited, but not prevented,
by differences in the internal institutional factors and this limitation resolves
itself into differences in the rate of profit. In Ricardo this feature adds to the
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role of that factor in explaining the differences in the subsistence real wages
in the trading countries. Hence, the important feature of RicardoÕs theory of
international trade is that the institutional factor is a source of intercountry
differences in the distributive variables which can explain the existence of
comparative advantage even in the presence of uniform tastes and uniform
technical knowledge across countries.
As to OhlinÕs contribution, many passages of the new appendix7 found in
the revised 1968 edition of his 1933 book and in his 1979 article show that,
contrary to the vulgar interpretation, his preferred approach, the
WalrasÐCassel general equilibrium (Ômutual interdependenceÕ in his words)
theory, includes among the givens not only the traditional factor endowments,
technology and preferences, but also the institutional factor. It also appears
that OhlinÕs scientific program in the field of trade theory is not confined to
the explanation of the pattern of trade in terms of the 2 ´ 2 ´ 2 factor propor-
tions model, but that he aims to apply the general equilibrium approach to that
theory and to enrich the latter by giving it an institutional content. In fact, he
recommends us to go beyond the simple HÐO model and to take into account,
besides tariffs and quotas, also the internal institutional factor in order to
explain international trade. We read (Ohlin, 1968: 309, italics added):
Besides the costs for the use of certain quantities of the factors of production Ð
quantities needed for production and transportation Ð the costs of production also
include taxes and social welfare fees, many of which bear an important relation to
international trade and yet are not included in general systems. It has long been a
mystery to me why existing accounts of international trade pay so little attention to
these problems. So many books and articles discuss the impact of a certain type of
taxation, viz., tariffs levied at the border when goods are imported, yet they devote
no space to the question of how other kinds of taxation can affect trade.
Despite this wide focus, Ohlin stretched too far the notion of factor propor-
tions as the unique determinant of the pattern of foreign trade. In particular, he
seems to claim that intercountry differences in the institutional factor (and
differences in technology as well) can be resolved into differences in factor
proportions. In OhlinÕs (1979) article we read:
The character of legislation and regulations about social rules of behaviour, for
example, hours of work per week, exercises an influence on factor proportions.
Highly important also are the systems of taxation and subsidies Ð their features and
levels Ð as well as the system of social-insurance payments. More work is needed to
illuminate the development of the supply of factors of production in each country, not
only their movement between countries . . . One should perhaps count British polit-
ical administration as one of the important Ôfactors of productionÕ exported to the
colonies Ð an export that provided relatively favourable conditions for economic
development. We economists have perhaps used an unduly narrow definition of the
factors of production and failed to distinguish between the different qualities of
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labour that are required for economic development . . . In one way or another, the
behaviour of institutions like trade unions may exercise an important influence on
costs and trade. (OhlinÕs, 1979: 5Ð11, emphasis added)
It is clear from the above passages that OhlinÕs perspective is much wider
than the narrow scope of the HÐO model with which his name is usually asso-
ciated. However, it is not clear whether Ohlin is suggesting that institutions
should be included in trade theory as a special additional factor of production,
besides and on the same grounds as the typical neoclassical factors (labour and
capital with or without land), or instead he is saying that the endowments of
such traditional factors, measured so to speak in efficiency units, should be
assumed to depend on the institutional factor. In any case a certain tension is
encountered in the choice of the hypotheses if we pursue such an extension of
the HÐO model. We should take into account that the ÔfeasibilityÕ of technical
processes reflects not only the technical knowledge but also the Ôinstitutional
factorÕ of the country: social norms, standards, laws, rules and conventions
determine, jointly with technical knowledge, which processes are feasible and
which are not (Parrinello, 1988b). Even if, following the HÐO model, techni-
cal knowledge is assumed to be evenly diffused across the two countries, the
set of feasible processes can be different because the institutional factor and
the endowment of other public goods can be different. If the government,
which is assumed to be their provider, is a representative government, the
assumption of differences in the institutional factors across countries can
hardly be disjointed from the assumption of different preferences in the two
countries, related to different cultures and lifestyles. Of course, we might
choose the assumption that preferences for private goods are the same and
independent of the amounts of public goods available, whereas preferences for
public goods are different, and then, if public goods are assumed to be exoge-
nous in the model, we might go on to assume uniform preferences across
countries. But this asymmetric procedure appears to be a purely ad hoc device.
Hence the assumption of specific institutional factors in the trading coun-
tries is at odds with the assumption of a uniform technology and uniform pref-
erences that characterizes the HeckscherÐOhlinÐSamuelson approach.
THE Ô INSTITUTIONAL FACTORÕ IN THE NEW TRADE
THEORY
The new trade theory seems to be a theoretical body which is more unified in
the field of increasing returns and imperfect competition than in its institu-
tional extension. In fact, the contributions of Grossman and Helpman (1991),
Helpman and Krugman (1986) and Krugman (1990, 1991) appear to be
260 Trade and location
complementary to the neoclassical tradition. By contrast, the focus of the new
trade theory on the Ôinstitutional factorÕ appears rather eclectic and it is diffi-
cult to find a unifying feature in this field of analysis beyond the treatment of
this factor as a public or collective good.
I will first illustrate by means of a simple adaptation of JonesÕs (1971)
model the distinction between the notion of an exogenous and an endogenous
institutional factor in the neoclassical theory of international trade.
Admittedly, this formulation is a sort of straw man whose role here is simply
to point out some weaknesses of the neo-institutional approach of the type
advocated by Posner (1972) and North and Thomas (1973), when applied to
the theory of international trade.8
Assume a closed economy in which the quantities X1, X2 of two goods are
produced only by labour. Let a1, a2 be the amounts of labour per unit of output
in the two industries. The institutional factor is represented by a public good
which enhances the productivity of labour in the two private industries. The
quantity of this good is measured by the amount of labour, Lp, used to produce
the good itself. Let
a1 = a1(Lp), a2 = a2(Lp) (1)
be the labour coefficient functions, both decreasing with Lp. A uniform nomi-
nal wage rate w rules in the economy and a uniform tax rate per unit of
employment, t, is raised in each industry. Assuming zero profits, we can write
the following general equilibrium model, composed of the price equations
under perfect competition,
p1 = (w + t)a1
p2 = (w + t)a2 (2)
the budget equation of the private sector,
p1 X1 + p2X2= (w + t)(L Ð Lp ) (3)
where L is the given total labour supply, and the budget equation of the public
sector,
t(a1 X1 + a2 X2 ) = w Lp (4)
The preferences of the representative consumer are described by the utility
function
U = U(X1/L, X2/L ).
For simplicity the public good is supposed not to enter into the utility function.
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Assuming that in equilibrium both goods are consumed, the optimal
consumption condition is:
U1 p1
ÐÐ = ÐÐ (5)
U2 p2
where Ui is the marginal utility of good i.
A case of an exogenous institutional factor is represented by a given
amount of the public good Lp. For example, Lp can measure the degree of
security, or an industrial standard, or a law which imposes a certain weekly
working time. Under suitable conditions of concavity imposed on function (1)
and on the utility function U, equations (1)Ð(5) can determine the equilibrium
values of relative prices pi/w, labour productivities 1/ai, quantities Xi, i = 1,2,
the allocation of the labour force between the amount Lp and the amounts
employed in the private industries, and the tax rate t.
By contrast, a simple example of an endogenous institutional factor
consists in assuming that the amount of the public good, Lp, is provided by the
government as a public choice. In the ideal case in which the objective func-
tion of the government coincides with the utility function of the representative
consumer, a Ôpolitical economyÕ equilibrium is found by the value of Lp that
solves the problem
MAX U(X1/L, X2/L ).
Lp
s.t. (1),(2),(3),(4),(5).
In this maximization problem Lp does not appear in the objective function,
but only in the constraints (1), (3), (4). The interpretation of the solution is
straightforward. Since equilibrium is associated with full employment, there is
a trade-off between the amount of labour (employed in the private sector),
which directly affects utility through the production of consumption goods,
and the amount of labour (employed in the public sector), which affects
consumer utility only indirectly, by increasing the productivity of labour in the
two industries. It is important for the theory of international trade whether or
not the two functions a1 = a1(Lp), a2 = a2(Lp) possess the same elasticity at
each amount Lp. In general they will not. Then the equilibrium of two closed
economies with different amounts of the public good Lp can be accompanied
with different equilibrium relative prices, p1/p2, although the labour coeffi-
cient functions (1) are the same in the two countries.
Suppose now that the economy is a small economy and that it opens to
foreign trade of private goods at a fixed world price, P = P1/P2. Without
262 Trade and location
special assumptions we cannot predict the good in which the country will
specialize from the comparison between the autarky price p1/p2 and the world
price P. The government intervention might subvert the comparative advan-
tage at the autarky level of Lp by changing the amount of the public input in
order to achieve the highest utility of the representative consumer. We can say
that the endogenous institutional factor brings about endogenous comparative
advantages.
This case of an endogenous institutional factor has been chosen to illustrate
some difficulties rather than to suggest an appealing direction for further
research. The choice of the objective function of the government, the amount
of information attributed to it and the measure of the public good (if the insti-
tutional factor is a law, what could be meant by the amount of law, measured
by a continuous variable such as Lp?) are preliminary problems for this
approach. I shall by-pass such problems. Furthermore I shall neglect the strat-
egy problem that we encounter if we assume a two-country model where each
country is not ÔsmallÕ. In this case we meet a strategy problem which involves
the two governments (see Krugman, (1986) and game theory would be the
common tool of analysis.9
Still assuming that the above difficulties can be circumvented, a basic prob-
lem remains and derives from a too bold application of the method of equilib-
rium for explaining institutions and institutional change. What is the notion of
such economic-political equilibrium? Some questionable features of such
equilibrium have been indicated by Field (1981) and Basu, Jones and Schlicht
(1987) in their critical assessment of the neo-institutionalism advocated by
North and Thomas (1973). They convincingly argue that we should reject the
extreme approach, according to which the causal variables of the changes in
the institutional factor can be reduced only to changes in economic parame-
ters: endowments, technologies and preferences via price changes, with the
exclusion of non-economic variables. The criticism points out that some basic
rules cannot be explained in this way and must be taken as exogenous with
respect to the economic process. The weakness of the approach should not be
attributed to the (legitimate) aspiration of explaining institutions and policy,
but to the kind of economic explanation based exclusively on the principle of
rational choice and competitive selection.
Yet, even without taking such a narrow economic position, the new trade
theory with endogenous institutions is questionable, because it deals with the
institutional factor as if all features of this factor could be subsumed under the
familiar notion of public good, of which national defence, lighthouses and
technical knowledge are typical examples. This simplistic reduction neglects
the fact that institutions, rules, customs and so on, besides being non-rival and
non-excludable to a certain extent, possess special features which bring about
an asymmetry between the explanation of their emergence and the explanation
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of their persistence. Economic theory can offer plausible explanations of why
an already established institutional setting persists in the face of a change in
the environment and why this setting can become suboptimal even if it was
initially optimal; but it does not offer a satisfactory explanation of why that
setting emerged rather than others. Historical, instead of structural, explana-
tion, and inertia, hysteresis and path dependency are prevailing in this area of
enquiry (see Akerlof, (1976). Pervasive indeterminacy of equilibrium,
conceived as a terminal point of a dynamic process, would be combined with
pervasive multiple equilibria in a Walrasian sense.
SOME CONCLUSIONS ON PROGRESS
In KrugmanÕs words:
The ÔnewÕ trade, growth, and business cycle theories of the past decade have
suggested to us a world view of economics that is very different from that of most
pre-1980 theory. Pervasive increasing returns and imperfect competition; multiple
equilibria everywhere; and often decisive role for history, accident, and perhaps
sheer self-fulfilling prophecy: these are the kind of ideas that are now becoming
popular. (Krugman, 1991: 8Ð9)
This statement of the specific analytical features of the new theory seems
to announce progress in the theory of international trade and to apply to the
comprehensive field that includes both streams (3) and (4) as mentioned in the
introduction. Can we share this view? Let us first dismiss some criticism
pertaining to certain easy claims of theoretical novelty and then let us focus on
a specific criterion of progress.
First, let us leave aside the criticism that tends to downgrade the contribu-
tion of the New Theory because its main ideas can already be found in the old
economists. The argument that Smith, Ricardo, Ohlin and others10 anticipated
the role of increasing returns, of history and of the institutional factor in trade
theory is not a conclusive criticism as such. Second, we should be tolerant of
terminology that exaggerates the novelty of the theory itself. For instance,
some representatives of the theory state, as a novel feature, that comparative
advantages are endogenous in the new trade theory, without reminding us that
these advantages are also endogenous in the old HÐOÐS model, albeit for
different reasons.11 Third, we do not insist on the fact that multiple equilibria
and dynamic indeterminacy of equilibrium had already been recognized as
non-exceptional features of general equilibrium theories before the 1980
theory.
Instead, let us turn our attention to a more substantial problem concerning
the progress of the new trade theory. If the pure theory of international trade
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means a theory that explains why some trade exists, then progress exists
because that theory adds some further ÔcausesÕ of trade to the old kit of inter-
country differences in factor proportions, technology and preferences.
However, the pure theory of international trade aims to explain not just the
existence of some trade, but the pattern of international trade. Is there any
progress in the theory of the pattern of trade? The answer depends on which
notion of explanation the theory is supposed to serve.
If explanation means prediction, then one main feature of the new theory is
the lack of a general theorem that allows one to predict the pattern of trade on
the basis of the structural givens of the trading countries. A similar limitation
was already clear before the emergence of the new models of trade. In partic-
ular, the debate on the dimensional issue related to the theory of capital has
shown that the pattern of trade in the multi-commodity case cannot be causally
determined, on the basis of factor proportions, in the absence of special
assumptions. At least the meaning of the traditional theorems has to be
changed and the change weakens the predictive role of their original versions.
Instead of causal relations between exogenous features of the economies and
the pattern of trade, the new interpretation can establish only correlations
between the latter and other endogenous variables (see Metcalf and Steedman,
1981).
We conclude that the new theory enriches the theory of international trade
because it analyses the role of additional causes of trade, but at the cost of
increasing the number of factors responsible for the indeterminacy of the
pattern of trade. From this perspective the assessment of progress in the new
trade theory cannot be separated from the assessment of OhlinÕs research
programme that recommends extending the theory of international trade along
the WalrasÐCassel guidelines and to including also the institutional factor; and
in turn the assessment of the OhlinÐSamuelson research programme, as Blaug
(1992) has already pointed out, cannot be separated from the assessment of the
modern general equilibrium programme. Then, if explanation of trade means
prediction of the pattern of trade, progress by the new trade theory is very
limited indeed. The new theory shares the lack of predictive content of the
general equilibrium theory for an integrated economy, in which the existence
of multiple equilibria and path dependency becomes the rule, in so far as it
imposes no testable restrictions on the pattern of exchange and specialization
among many agents. ÔAlmost anything might happen as regards the pattern of
international tradeÕ is the motto that can be written at the end of the above
quotation from Krugman.
This negative evaluation of the new theory must be suspended if we aban-
don the instrumentalist position centred on the equation that explanation
equals prediction, and we want instead to use the theory to understand histor-
ical patterns of international trade. In this different perspective, which is close
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to the hermeneutic tradition,12 the new trade theory might cast some light. We
must wait and see whether simulations, ex post predictions and understanding
of international economic history can be usefully carried out on the basis of
the new theory and whether the formal models of the new theory are more
useful for this purpose than the non formalized ideas found in predecessors
like Smith, Ricardo and Ohlin. The paucity so far of this kind of investigation
makes premature the assessment of progress according to this different crite-
rion.
My argument suggests that trade theorists should retreat to the safer ground
in which the theory of international trade takes into account the existence of
different exogenous institutional factors in the trading countries, on which the
comparative advantages depend. The explanation of such differences should
be left over to the historical narrative instead of being a rational choice of
public goods.13 In the next section I will argue that the institutional factor can
usefully be modelled as an exogenous source of comparative advantage and
that a non-Walrasian theory of international trade is better apt to embed such
a factor, compared with the HeckscherÐOhlin-Samuelson tradition.
THE EXOGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL FACTOR IN A
NON-WALRASIAN APPROACH
A basic non-Walrasian trade approach (called the NW approach from now on)
has already been adopted in some models of international trade (see
Emmanuel, 1969; Parrinello, 1970; Steedman, 1979; Negishi, 1985). Assume
a two-country world economy in which many goods are produced with the aid
of the same goods and labour. In the simplest case, given sets of linear
processes with no joint production are available in the two countries. The
processes may be different across countries and constant returns to scale
prevail everywhere. The apostrophe denotes the symbol attached to one of the
two countries. The typical closure of the NW model consists in assuming the
real wages, w and wÕ, as given in the two countries; and imposing a given rela-
tion between the corresponding rates of profits, r and rÕ. In the simple case a
fixed proportion r = crÕ (see also Negishi, 1985) is assumed with c a positive
parameter reflecting a compensating profit rate differential related to different
risks of investment and obstacles to capital movements across the two coun-
tries. In this model capital is mobile across countries, subject to the limitation
of this differential. Furthermore, since in principle each commodity is
produced and can be used as a means of production in combination with
labour, the NW approach inherently represents a theory in which the number
of inputs is greater than the number of products. The international long-period
equilibrium is ultimately determined on the basis of the same logic underlying
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the choice of techniques within an integrated economy. Equilibrium is associ-
ated with a uniform wage rate and a uniform profit rate in each country, but
these rates can differ across countries. It is also compatible with involuntary
unemployment and with capital and labour movements across the two coun-
tries within the limits of balanced trade and the differentials in the distributive
variables. With regard to capital movements, we can envisage a Ômultina-
tionalÕ class of capitalists who can freely invest in both countries. The model
should be slightly revised and reinterpreted if we adopt RicardoÕs idea that
each country has its own capitalists who are more reluctant to move their capi-
tal abroad than at home. In this case the two classes of capitalists may have
different propensities to invest abroad because of different idiosyncrasies
about foreign institutions, cultures and languages existing abroad.14
How can a model of the type described above be extended to deal with the
exogenous Ôinstitutional factorÕ and how will such extensions perform in
comparison with the extension of the Walrasian model within the same field ?
A natural feature of the NW approach which includes the Ô institutional factorÕ
is that the set of production processes and individual tastes can be assumed to
be different across countries. We say ÔnaturalÕ because such a model is not
constructed for the sake of demonstration of theorems which relate the pattern
of trade to the economic structure of the isolated countries. In addition, to the
extent that the institutional factor is produced, its production process should
be represented by means of a time-phased analysis. Of course, an important
difference exists between such a process and the processes in the private
sector. The former absorbs private inputs and perhaps benefits from other
public inputs, but no price equation with a uniform profit rate should be asso-
ciated with this process. This special ÔproductionÕ process should be assumed
to be activated exogenously in so far as it is not governed by competition and
profit-seeking behaviour. Then different private production processes can be
assumed to correspond to different quantities of public goods in each country.
Such representation implies that differences in the institutional factor across
countries bring about differences in comparative advantages and affect the
pattern of trade specialization in so far as they do not equally affect the
productivity across industries.
A certain caution is required in making assumptions for extending the NW
approach through the inclusion of the institutional factor. I will suggest two
warnings. First, equilibrium in the NW approach is compatible with unem-
ployment and with labour mobility across countries. In particular, unemployed
workers from one country can move to the other country even under the
prospect of remaining unemployed, if the social norms, for example, unem-
ployment benefits, are more favourable in one country than in the other. In
general, labour movements can occur not just because they are induced by
capital movements, but because people can vote also with their feet. If the
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institutional factor should be related to the action of a representative govern-
ment, a certain indeterminism in the equilibrium solution would be unavoid-
able in the absence of further assumptions which put a limit on the changes in
the composition of the population of each country and in the corresponding
political consensus for different institutional factors. This kind of indetermin-
ism adds to that encountered in the absence of public goods in a one-country
model. In fact equilibrium unemployment with given wages can be associated
with the presence of a labour force which is homogeneous in terms of effi-
ciency but heterogeneous in terms of tastes: in this case it is indifferent for a
firm to hire certain workers instead of others, but the composition of the social
product depends on the composition of aggregate demand, the latter being
affected by which workers are actually employed and which remain unem-
ployed.
The second warning is more fundamental because it concerns the limita-
tions of the comparative statics that is usually performed to examine the gains
and the losses from trade. Such comparative analysis must imply a compara-
tive institutional analysis. In particular, we must avoid what Sdersten (1980)
called Ôthe flaw in RicardoÕs argumentÕ, but which indeed reflects RicardoÕs
implicit value judgment without flaw. The point is well known: in the absence
of a redistribution policy there is no guarantee that moving from autarky to
free trade will not harm some group of consumers. In SderstenÕs words:
the doctrine of free trade was one of the cornerstones of economic liberalism.We
have now arrived at the slightly paradoxical situation that this doctrine can be saved
only if a policy of intervention is pursued concomitantly with it. Hence it follows
that economic liberalism in the sense of letting market conditions determine produc-
tion and consumption, can be justified on welfare grounds without reservation, only
if redistribution goes with it. (Sdersten, 1970: 22)
This argument can be used in the current debate about increasing global-
ization. It suggests that the comparative statics analysis used to prove the
welfare properties of international trade must be constrained in a certain sense.
We should assume not only a given assortment of techniques (whose choice is
endogenous), but also a given assortment of institutional settings which limits
the number of states of the economy which the trade theorist can compare in
his comparative statics. The exogenous institutional factor associated with
such states must belong to the given institutional feasible set. This set should
be chosen on the basis of historical investigation and separate analyses offered
by other social sciences. From this point of view, the usual comparative analy-
sis of a closed versus an open economy can lead to arbitrary conclusions,
either because free trade might not bring about gains in a non-ambiguous
sense or because such comparison would not be allowed because one or even
both terms of reference (for example, the closed versus the open economy)
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might not belong to the feasible institutional set. For example, the complete
absence of tariffs with no other compensating public intervention might not be
feasible. In particular, with regard to marginal analysis, the partial derivative
of the equilibrium value of a certain endogenous variable (for example, the
real wage rate), relative to a certain institutional variable (for example, the
amount of a tariff), becomes undefined, if the change in the latter, under the
ceteris paribus clause, is infeasible. Marginal changes in individual institu-
tional variables might not be allowed. Only a cluster of changes in institutional
variables might be possible.
NOTES
* The author wishes to thank Ian Steedman for his linguistic revision of this draft and
comments, under the usual exemption from responsibility.
1. See Jones and Scheinkman (1977), Deardorff (1980), Ethier (1984).
2. See Steedman (1979), Smith (1984).
3. See Emmanuel (1969), Parrinello (1970, (1988a), Steedman and Metcalfe (1972), Negishi
(1985, 1989).
4. See Brecher (1974) and others.
5. See Lovasy (1941), Lancaster (1980), Helpman and Krugman (1986), Krugman (1990,
1995), Grossman and Helpman (1991).
6. See Lindbeck (1976), Casella and Feinstein (1990), Clarida and Findlay (1991), Bhagwati
and Hudec (1996).
7. In this appendix Ohlin anticipates one of the main results of the new trade theory under item
(3) above: ÔEven in a case where the endowment of factors is the same in various countries,
trade is possible between them Ð as well as between regions within each country Ð because
specialization and large-scale operations entail advantagesÕ (Ohlin, 1933, 1968: 309].
8. Recent developments of that approach can be found in the works of Casella and Feinstein
(1990), Clarida and Findlay (1991) and Casella (1996), and the following model does not do
justice to some interesting insights of the latter contributions.
9. In this regard, recent contributions apply the theory of clubs in order to answer the follow-
ing interesting question related to the current perspective of globalization and harmonization
of norms across the trading countries:
Without setting preconditions for free trade, without formal treaties between govern-
ments, would trade itself lead individuals to establish similar standards? . . . If some
convergence occurs, does it need to be inefficient, as in many Ôrace to the bottomÕ argu-
ments, or can it be the appropriate response to the changed allocations caused by trade
flows? (Casella, 1996: 120).
10. In Chapter 13, Meardon has rightly emphasized the anticipatory role played by Myrdal
(1957] through his idea of cumulative causation. We can add also the name of Kaldor for his
path-breaking role in respect to the new trade theory.
11. A different issue is that in the new trade theory the comparative advantages of two countries
cannot be determined by comparing the equilibrium states of the two isolated economies.
12. Elsewhere (Parrinello 1999) I have dealt with the distinct roles that can be assigned to
economic theories on the basis of the two notions of explanation, that is, prediction and
understanding.
13. Schumpeter (1961: 4Ð5) writes: Ôwhen we succeed in finding a definite causal relation
between two phenomena, our problem is solved if the one which plays the ÔcausalÕ role is
non-economic. We have then accomplished what we, as economists, are capable of in the
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case in question and we must give place to other disciplines. If, on the other hand, the causal
factor is itself economic in nature, we must continue our explanatory efforts until we ground
upon a non-economic bottom.Õ
The supporters of the recent neo-institutionalist models of trade with endogenous govern-
ment might agree with SchumpeterÕs position either because their Ôpolitical economyÕ is
supposed to be a discipline different from economics or because they believe that explain-
ing government behaviour  la North has not yet trespassed on the borders of economic
explanation and therefore is a legitimate extension. Whatever position they take in this
respect, there remains the criticism of the dubious notion of Ôequilibrium institutionsÕ under-
lying the neo-institutional approach.
14. In this case we should take into account that the compensating profit rate differentials can
be different between the two classes of capitalists. Then, a specific fixed c coefficient is
assumed to apply to each class, and international investments will be ruled by the class with
the lowest c.
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